An issue was discovered in adns before 1.5.2. adns_rr_info mishandles a
bogus *datap. The general pattern for formatting integers is to sprintf
into a fixed-size buffer. This is correct if the input is in the right
range; if it isn't, the buffer may be overrun (depending on the sizes of
the types on the current platform). Of course the inputs ought to be right.
And there are pointers in there too, so perhaps one could say that the
caller ought to check these things. It may be better to require the caller
to make the pointer structure right, but to have the code here be defensive
about (and tolerate with an error but without crashing) out-of-range
integer values. So: it should defend each of these integer conversion sites
with a check for the actual permitted range, and return adns_s_invaliddata
if not. The lack of this check causes the SOA sign extension bug to be a
serious security problem: the sign extended SOA value is out of range, and
overruns the buffer when reconverted. This is related to sign extending SOA
32-bit integer fields, and use of a signed data type.
Source: adns (LP Ubuntu Debian)
Ubuntu 12.04 ESM (Precise Pangolin):DNE
Ubuntu 14.04 ESM (Trusty Tahr):DNE
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (Xenial Xerus):needed
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS (Bionic Beaver):needed
Ubuntu 20.04 LTS (Focal Fossa):needed
Ubuntu 20.10 (Groovy Gorilla):not-affected (1.6.0-2)
More Information

Updated: 2020-09-09 21:39:34 UTC (commit b67d7d8b03f173f825cd706df5bd078bca500b0e)