OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake
then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if
you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the
explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and
SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if
SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function
call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application
for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without
being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer. In order
to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present that
resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having
already received a fatal error. OpenSSL version 1.0.2b-1.0.2m are affected.
Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2n. OpenSSL 1.1.0 is not affected.
leosilvathis issue does not affect OpenSSL 1.1.0
mdeslaur1.0.2b introduced a security hardening mechanism designed to
protect against bugs in application code.;a=commit;h=e4f77bf1833245d2b6aa4ce6a16c85e1cdf78589
This CVE applies to the hardening mechanism being incomplete.
openssl versions older than 1.0.2b don't have the hardening
mechanism at all.
Ubuntu 12.04 ESM (Precise Pangolin):not-affected (code not present)
Ubuntu 14.04 ESM (Trusty Tahr):not-affected (code not present)
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (Xenial Xerus):released (1.0.2g-1ubuntu4.10)
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS (Bionic Beaver):released (1.0.2n-1ubuntu1)
Upstream:;a=commit;h=c7383fb5f21aa3451f76bb98bdd5a96b070a2c47 (test)
More Information

Updated: 2020-09-10 05:39:21 UTC (commit 81a23a978c4436cd99e1d040e9e73e9146876281)